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Abstract 
We  present  a  model  of  CSR  as  a  set  of  mechanisms  for  aligning  corporate 
behaviour with the interests of society in reducing externalities and promoting a 
sustainable corporate sector.  These mechanisms include voluntary action by 
companies to go above minimum legal standards, with the aim of enhancing 
competitiveness  (‘action  beyond  compliance’);  interventions  by  regulators 
designed  to  promote  self-regulation  by  industry  (‘reflexive  law’);  and  steps 
taken by shareholders to put pressure on companies to make effective use of 
corporate assets (shareholder engagement).  We then assess the degree to which 
the  model  is  realized  in  current  British  practice.    Focusing  on  the  issue  of 
working conditions, we find managerial resistance to the linking of CSR with 
internal employee relations, and obstacles to shareholder engagement on this 
issue. 
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Introduction 
 
Corporate  social  responsibility  (CSR)  has  been  a  focus  for  several  policy 
initiatives  in  Britain  since  the  late  1990s.      A  government  ministry,  the 
Department of Trade and Industry, was given the task of promoting CSR, and 
set about stimulating debate and disseminating good practice (DTI, 2001, 2002).  
Institutional  shareholders  were  encouraged  to  use  their  influence  with  listed 
companies to press the case for fair employment practices and related aspects of 
a  CSR  agenda.    The  government-sponsored  review  of  company  law,  while 
stopping  a  long  way  short  of  endorsing  a  ‘stakeholder-based’  agenda  for 
corporate governance, nevertheless supported legal reforms designed to bring 
about ‘greater shareholder engagement and a long-term investment culture’.
1   
 
Yet concrete results of this process have so far been limited.  This is particularly 
the  case  for  the  area  we  focus  on  here,  the  ‘social’  dimension  of  corporate 
responsibility and its role in promoting improvements in working conditions.  In 
part this is because of the recent watering down, apparently under the pressure 
of business lobbying, of some of the core proposals for company law reform.  
However, it is also the result of a lukewarm response from the corporate and 
financial sectors, to which most of the governmental discourse on CSR has been 
addressed. Within the listed company sector, management tends to view CSR as 
concerned with ‘external’ issues, such as the organization of supply chains and 
ethical trading concerns, and rules out its application to ‘internal’ employment 
issues.  The reaction of the financial sector has been equally sceptical, in ways 
which  indicate  some  serious  shortcomings  in  the  model  of  shareholder 
engagement  which  underpins  many  current  discussions  of  CSR.    Given  this 
uncertain prospect for CSR in the UK, we ask: is the UK government’s CSR 
initiative, while attractive in principle, a model with no basis in the practice of 
employment relations and corporate governance in Britain?  After reviewing the 
conception of CSR advanced by the DTI in the early 2000s, and comparing it to 
the emerging notion of CSR at EU level, we look, in turn, at evidence drawn 
from organisational case studies on the implementation of labour standards in 
the  area  of  working  time,  and  investigations  of  shareholder  engagement  on 
employment issues, in each case studying the interaction of corporate practice 
with the changing regulatory framework. 
 
Redefining CSR: managerial, regulatory and financial perspectives 
 
The redefinition of CSR offered by the DTI in its 2001 document, Business and 
Society.  Developing  Corporate  Social  Responsibility  in  the  UK,  marked  a 
significant  step  forward  in  the  process  of  reconceptualising  CSR.    CSR  is, 
according to this document, associated with reputation: ‘the costs and benefits   2 
of  a  company’s  goods  and  services,  how  it  treats  its  employees  and  the 
environment,  its  record  on  human  rights…’;  competitiveness:  managing 
‘supplier  and  customer  relationships,  workforce  diversity  and  work/life 
balances…’;  and  risk:  ‘the  wide  range  of  risks  to  which  [the  company]  is 
exposed  –  whether  financial,  regulatory,  environmental,  or  from  customer 
attitudes’  (DTI,  2001:  4).    This  is,  then,  an  expression  of  a  managerial  or 
organisational conception of CSR, that is, one which argues that, by embedding 
CSR in its organisational structures and routines, the company will be better 
placed to deal with future competitive shocks, caused for example by shifting 
consumer tastes, and with regulatory changes.  Reputation is seen as a corporate 
asset which management must conserve and enhance.  This is not a matter of 
basic  compliance  with  externally  mandated  regulation;  the  enterprise  which 
goes  ‘beyond  compliance’  is  thereby  securing  for  itself  a  competitive 
advantage, in terms of its greater anticipation of, and responsiveness to, external 
changes.  
 
The financial perspective is concerned with the use of capital market pressures 
and shareholder engagement as mechanisms for realigning managerial strategies 
with  the  case  for  social  and  environmental  sustainability.    The  so-called 
‘universal owner’ hypothesis argues that shareholder activism is in the process 
of becoming a powerful weapon for CSR (Hawley and Williams, 2002).  This is 
because,  firstly,  institutional  investors,  in  particular  the  large  pension  funds, 
increasingly recognise that long term sustainability, both of corporations and of 
society more generally, is the precondition for being able to deliver on pension 
promises  which  will  be  effective  several  decades  into  the  future.    Thus 
institutional investors are potentially persuadable of the virtues of taking a long-
term view of their holdings.   
 
Secondly,  the  breadth  of  institutional  holdings  is  an  important  factor.  
Institutional investors have been called ‘universal owners’ because, on the one 
hand, they collectively represent the large mass of wage earners and savers in 
societies such as the UK and the US which are heavily reliant on private sector 
pension and insurance provision, and secondly because they tend to take a small 
but significant stake in nearly all listed companies as a way of spreading risk.  
This  dual  ‘universalisation’  of  the  role  of  the  shareholder  means  that  the 
institutions have strong incentives to encourage companies to avoid strategies 
based  on  the  shifting  of  costs  on  to  third  parties  or  society  at  large,  since 
whatever the short-term benefit for the company and its investors may be, over 
the longer term these costs will inevitably come home to the institutions and 
their own ‘principals’ in some form or another (pension fund beneficiaries and 
savers are also employees with an interest in a high quality of employment, and 
individuals who would like to breathe unpolluted air).     3 
The  regulatory  perspective  on  CSR  complements  the  other  two.    This  is  a 
conception of regulation in which a certain functional relationship is established 
between a ‘core’ or possibly a ‘framework’ of legal controls, on the one hand, 
and voluntary action by companies on the other.  The European Commission 
Green Paper on CSR of 2001 defined CSR as ‘a concept whereby companies 
decide voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment’ 
(Commission  2001:  5),  but  qualified  this  by  insisting  that  CSR  ‘must  be 
understood as complementing regulation or legislation or norms on social and 
environmental rights, for which it cannot be a substitute’ (Commission, 2001: 
8).  The DTI’s 2001 paper is more voluntaristic in tone, but, on the other hand, 
does  not  seek  to  portray  CSR  as  a  form  of  deregulation.    What  both  the 
European  Commission  and  DTI  papers  have  in  common  is  a  regulatory 
conception of CSR which views it in terms of mechanisms which respond to the 
negative externalities caused by corporate activities.  Against the background of 
a belief that there is a limit to what can be achieved by ‘command and control’ 
regulation,  voluntary  action  by  companies  to  improve  the  social  and 
environment context of their activities is seen as preferable to mandated legal 
regulation.  The role of the law is not necessarily to set absolute standards, but 
to create an incentive structure under which companies which minimise harms 
are rewarded, and those which increase them are penalised.  This requires the 
creation of information flows which more accurately capture the externality-
creating effects of corporate behaviour.  This opens up a debate about the use of 
disclosure rules to ensure a more effective flow of information to shareholders 
on issues of social and environmental sustainability, and the use of corporate 
governance  rules  to  embed  effective  risk-management  and  internal  audit 
mechanisms  inside  the  organisation.    These  are  all  aspects  of  a  so-called 
‘reflexive law’ approach to business regulation. 
 
This, then, is the emerging model: a view of CSR as a set of related mechanisms 
for aligning corporate behaviour with wider social and environmental goals, in 
which managerial, financial and regulatory aspects are combined in a mutually 
reinforcing way.  How far does the model correspond to reality?  To investigate 
this we will look, in turn, at evidence drawn from organisational case studies 
and  investigations  of  shareholder  engagement,  in  each  case  studying  the 
interaction of corporate practice with the changing regulatory framework. 
 
CSR  as  a  mechanism  for  implementing  labour  standards:  the  case  of 
working time  
 
Working time is an area which is only loosely regulated by law in the UK; the 
48-hour working week which is contained in UK legislation implementing the 
EU  Working  Time  Directive,  can  be  modified  according  to  the  needs  of   4 
individual enterprises, and varied by either collective or individual agreement 
(see Deakin and Morris, 2005: 207-320).  At the same time, a ‘business case’ 
for working time reductions can be made, on the grounds that excessively long 
working  hours  are  not  simply  detrimental  to  the  well  being  (and  in  some 
instances  the  health  and  safety)  of  employees,  but  may  also  undermine 
organizational  innovation,  with  negative  repercussions  for  productivity  (see 
Barnard, Deakin and Hobbs, 2003 for a review of the arguments).  On the face 
of  it,  then,  the  issue  of  working  time  is  an  ideal  one  for  uniting  the 
organisational and regulatory dimensions of CSR: within the framework set by 
law,  there  is  space  for  voluntary  corporate  behaviour  ‘beyond  compliance’ 
which would enhance the sustainability of the enterprise while also addressing a 
significant issue of social policy.   
 
European Commission has made numerous statements associating employment 
issues  with  the  corporate  social  responsibility  agenda.  The  Commission  has 
declared that ‘employment and social policy integrates the principles of CSR, in 
particular,  through  the  European  Employment  Strategy’  (Commission,  2002: 
19).  The Council Resolution on CSR of 2002 emphasised that ‘undertakings 
should  address  not  only  the  external  aspects  of  CSR,  but  also  the  internal 
aspects’,  that  is  to  say,  relations  with  the  company’s  own  employees.
2  This 
followed the European Commission’s Green Paper, which stated that, ‘[w]ithin 
the  company,  socially  responsible  practices  primarily  involve  employees’ 
(Commission, 2001: 9).  Thus the European Union’s position is that CSR is a 
mechanism  which  can  be  used  to  promote  the  implementation  of  fair 
employment  practices  and address  issues  of  human  resource  management at 
enterprise level.   
 
By  contrast,  the  UK  government’s  approach  to  the  link  between  CSR  and 
employment issues has been a highly selective one.  A number of the policy 
documents published by UK government on CSR since 2001 have accepted that 
the  improvement  of  working  conditions  should  be  an  element  of  the  CSR 
agenda, but hardly mention working time or any other basic labour standards.  
Thus what the DTI refers to as ‘the business case for CSR’ seeks to explain why 
companies  should  ‘spend  time  and  energy  on  helping  communities,  on 
protecting the environment or on improving working conditions’ (DTI, 2001: 
14).    Where  UK  government  pronouncements  on  CSR  have  alluded  to 
employment matters, most attention has been paid to the issues of equality and 
diversity.  Three  paragraphs  were  dedicated  to  these  linked  issues  in  the 
government’s 2002 CSR Report, which also stated that ‘the fundamentals of 
equal opportunities are a central plank of CSR’ (DTI, 2002: 14). However, other 
employment issues, such as ‘improving working conditions’ (DTI, 2001: 14), 
‘health  and  safety’  (DTI,  2002:  7)  and  ‘work/life  balance’  (DTI,  2001:  4)   5 
merited only a single sentence (or more accurately part of a sentence) in the 
government’s CSR publications. 
 
How has this uncertain and ambivalent discourse linking the CSR agenda to 
working conditions been received in practice?  We draw here on evidence from 
a study of the implementation of the Working Time Directive in the UK, carried 
out  for  the  European  Commission  as  part  of  its  recent  review  of  the  UK’s 
implementation of the Working Time Directive.
3  However, we found very little 
evidence  of  firms  going  beyond  the  minimum  standards  set  by  law,  and 
widespread use of the low-risk option of obtaining individual waivers of the 
right  not  to  work  more  than  48  hours  per  week.    Opportunities  for  social 
dialogue and related forms of deliberation in achieving a balance between legal 
protection and flexibility of working arrangements had not been taken up, and 
this was reflected in the marginal place accorded to CSR as a mechanism for 
stimulating organizational change. 
 
We  did  find  some  recognition  of  a  relationship  between  working  time 
regulation, health and safety and CSR. According to the Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD), 
 
‘There is an ethical issue about working time…employers believe 
there  are  ethical  issues  underpinning  the  Regulations…  Even 
though  employers  did  not  welcome  the  [Working  Time 
Regulations] our members told us that they did understand what 
the Regulations were driving at. They did oppose the Regulations 
as  a  matter  of  principle…  [but]  there  was,  certainly  in  the  HR 
community, an understanding that there were issues about health 
which arguably are ethical issues.’ 
 
A hospital trust told us that: 
 
‘there is quite a lot to be said for corporate social responsibility for 
public organisations, in particular from a risk management point of 
view. If you look at the research that says people working long 
hours are not giving of their best, then I think [working time is an 
element of CSR]. There is an issue about the service to patients 
when people who are overtired are not making quality decisions.’  
 
The finance industry union UNIFI was impressed by the approach taken by a 
major high street bank with regard to CSR and work-life balance: 
   6 
‘It is all about peoples’ lives outside work and having some sort of 
responsibility  for  your  workforce  beyond  just  getting  the  last 
pound of flesh from them… It is about attracting the best staff and 
keeping them.  It is also about promoting a positive image in the 
labour market and to customers. But, I think there is a belief in the 
moral aspects as well… They mean it.  They really, really mean it 
and the business imperative underlies the moral desire to do things 
right.’ 
 
However, in most other cases there was evidence of employer resistance to the 
idea  of  relationship  between  working  time  regulation  and  corporate  social 
responsibility.  Three of our case study employers argued that responsibility for 
employees’  health  and  safety  is  had  to  be  qualified  by  the  need  to  provide 
employees  with  a  decent  standard  of  living  job  security.  For  example,  a 
construction firm said that, ‘we aim to be a good employer at all times, with 
health  and  safety  of  our  workers  paramount.    [However],  increased  earning 
potential as a result of overtime availability obviously affects the employee and 
their family in bringing increased affluence.’ A food manufacturer also argued 
that  there  was  a  balance  to  be  made  between  CSR  for  working  time  and 
providing workers with a decent standard of living: 
 
‘If  you  asked  me  that  question  [i.e.  is  working  time  an  aspect  of 
CSR?] in isolation I would say ‘yes’. If you said to me how do you 
feel about working for a business as a personnel director where your 
employees are working a sixty-hour week I would say ‘I do not like it. 
It is wrong.’ But it is not that simple. I would also say that we have a 
responsibility to pay our people a liveable wage. If the only way they 
can earn a liveable wage is to work long hours then we have to live 
with that. You cannot go out on a limb as a company and overpay 
your people or you will not survive and you will not have jobs at all. 
So, it is not that simple. It is not one-dimensional. I also think we have 
a number of other responsibilities and it is getting a balance between 
them all.’ 
A foreign-owned car manufacturer also argued that a balance had to be made 
between different elements of CSR:  
‘Clearly  [working  time  is  part  of  CSR].  It  is  part  of  a  wider 
responsibility, which in our case is health and safety. We have been 
nominated number one company in the UK for health and safety. But, 
you can also link CSR to job security and particularly for our kind of 
work, where it is shop floor manual work, job security is the number   7 
one attraction… Overtime flexibility allows us to ride out the peaks 
and  troughs.  That  in  turn  allows  us  to  provide  job  security  [for 
workers]. So, you cannot just look at one particular aspect [of CSR]… 
Obviously making sure people have an appropriate financial stability 
is another aspect as well as making sure that people have a reasonable 
work situation whether that is in terms of facilities, working hours etc. 
All those things need to be balanced.’ 
The link between CSR and labour standards was particularly strongly resisted 
by  employers’  associations  and  representatives  of  business  interests.    The 
Institute of Directors distinguished between the Working Time Directive, which 
it had opposed, and corporate social responsibility for working time, which it 
supported:  
  
‘Certainly from any official announcements on policy from the IoD 
centrally I think we would assume that working time is an issue 
that comes under the rubric of corporate social responsibility and I 
am sure a lot of individual directors would take that view as well… 
As well as obviously wanting to look after ones workers as well as 
one can in terms of not actually imposing long hours upon them we 
know from our own research that a lot of directors have made quite 
liberal or progressive moves to workplace flexibility. We know a 
large number of directors, for example, allow employees to work at 
home or to work flexi-time and we know they are great supporters 
of part time work… So, in that respect I think it is quite a nice little 
counterbalance towards our attitudes towards the Working Time 
Regulations.’ 
 
Similarly, the HR director of a hospital trust did not recognise the regulation of 
working time as part of the work-life balance agenda:  
 
‘Outside of the local authority we are the biggest employer in the 
area and so we have a social responsibility. Working hours is part 
of that…it is called “Improving Working Lives” in the NHS… We 
are running a project to co-ordinate childcare arrangements across 
the two health communities we serve…We have had an enormous 
amount of success with employee led rostering… So, I think it is 
issues  like  that  that  have  more  impact  than  the  regulations  on 
working  time…  Giving  people  control  of  their  own  working 
patterns is a real benefit for them and if we are serious about the 
work-life balance, regulation should assist that process not inhibit 
it.’   8 
The TUC also indicated that employers view the regulation of working time as 
distinct from the work-life balance agenda:  
 
‘[Employers] might say something about work-life balance. But I 
think that has got more to do with increased participation in the 
labour  market  by  women  who  are…looking  for  flexibility  that 
enables  them  to  balance  their  work  and  their  caring 
responsibilities…  And  employers  understanding  better  that  to 
retain  good  employees  they  need  to  offer  them  a  degree  of 
flexibility on family friendly issues… Some flexibility of hours, 
the right to work part-time, perhaps paid paternity leave or paid 
parental leave. But, that is about it. It is that angle that gets picked 
up, if it gets picked up at all, in the CSR debate… But, this does 
not get to the really difficult question which is what are you going 
to  do  about  all  the  people  who  are  working  more  than  48  and 
around  about  60  hours  per  week…  My  sense  is  that  the  two 
rhetorics of excessive working hours on the one hand and work-life 
balance on the other are still going down separate tracks.’ 
 
In particular, there was evidence that employers tend to conceive of CSR as 
incorporating a set of external issues concerning the image and reputation of the 
company rather than the issue of its employment conditions. According to the 
TUC, 
 
‘Employment standards in British companies is not something that 
has featured as an aspect of CSR. CSR is about poor people in 
developing countries. It is not about how you treat your workers at 
home. We are struggling to work with Business in the Community 
to try and get their member organisations to understand that it is 
important. The way you treat your workforce is a hallmark of how 
responsible you are as an employer and as a company. But, I would 
say it has simply not featured in the mainstream of the CSR debate 
at all.’ 
The trade union AMICUS provided a similar view about companies’ attitudes to 
the content of CSR. 
 
‘CSR is what happens outside the workplace as far as [companies] 
are  concerned.  It  does  not  relate  at  all  to  what  goes  on  within. 
Many  of  the  companies  that  have  apparently  good  policies  on 
[CSR] issues are some of the worst examples of working hours. 
Not so much with their own staff, but three quarters of the staff   9 
they employ are contractors and they know that the contracts that 
they  issue  must  demand  that  the  contracted  staff  work  these 
additional hours. It is the only way it can happen.’ 
Evidence from the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) also illustrated 
the external orientation of CSR policies in many companies: 
 ‘I do not think the Working Time Regulations are seen as a central 
part  of  CSR.  I  think  CSR  is  very  much  external.  One  of  the 
criticisms that we, as well as others, had about the Commission’s 
[Green] Paper was that it was so focused on the workforce. We 
said,  “hold  on  a  minute,  we  thought  CSR  was  about  the 
environment, exploitation of child labour you know those sorts of 
issues”.  We  were  very  surprised  to  see  that  this  was  a  DG 
Employment agenda being pushed through under the guise of CSR. 
To  some  extent  that  has  an  educational  function  [as  some 
employers] have now learnt that some of their company policies 
are CSR… if they can tie it into CSR then they see it as a bonus. 
But  they  will  have  focused  on  building  relationships  with  the 
community and relationships with schools, and the environmental 
[aspects]. I do not think their focus has changed at all.’  
An interviewee from the CIPD endorsed the view that most employers conceive 
of CSR as relating to external matters: 
 
‘As far as they do, [companies] usually think of [CSR] in relation 
to  community  activities  or  terms  and  conditions  of  overseas 
workers, company reputation. They take a very external view of 
CSR. I would be very cautious about putting the words working 
time  and  CSR together  because  I  do  not  think the debate  takes 
place in those terms.’ 
Similarly,  the  HR  Director  of  an  investment  bank  believed  that  ‘to  a  large 
extent’ CSR is conceived in terms of external factors like the environment and 
the  community.  So,  although  the  firm  was  ‘quite  good  in  terms  of  our 
involvement in the community like monetary donations’ he was ‘not convinced 
[working time] would be viewed automatically’ as an aspect of CSR.   
 
The range of views which we have just reported contains some nuanced and 
carefully considered responses to the issue of CSR.  Some firms take it seriously 
and are attempting to give expression to the aims of CSR at organisational level.  
However,  for many  firms CSR is regarded as  simply irrelevant to issues of 
employment conditions.  On this issue, at least, the broad definition of CSR set 
out in the DTI’s 2001 policy paper finds little echo, so far, in corporate practice.    10 
But that practice is not so far out of line with the UK government’s highly 
ambivalent position on whether the management of human resources within the 
enterprise is an appropriate issue for CSR. 
 
Shareholder engagement on employment issues 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that the financial dimension of CSR is on the 
policy  agenda  in  Britain  and  is  having  an  increasing  impact  in  practice.  
According  to  the  Association  of  British  Insurers,  the  main  trade  body  for 
institutional investors, the principle of socially responsible investment has  
 
‘made  all  companies  susceptible  to  pressure  from  substantial 
shareholders on CSR risks… Greater investor activity fuels greater 
corporate activity, which itself adds to the growing interest from 
investors’ (ABI, 2001: 13).   
 
The same document commented that CSR can be seen as  
 
‘concerned with the management of ‘downside risk’ – the dangers 
for  companies  which  lurk  in  the  CSR  forest.  But  in  many 
cases…identifying ways to strengthen a brand against a potential 
threat could produce opportunities to enhance value.’ (ABI 2001: 
35). 
 
The link between risk and reputation has been made in the context of some 
employment issues.  A 2002 report to the Health and Safety Executive, based on 
a series of interviews with institutional investors, concluded that there was  
 
‘a  significant  level  of  interest  in  health  and  safety  among 
institutional  investors,  and  that  it  fits  well  into  corporate  social 
responsibility  /  socially  responsible  investment.  Investors  are 
generally supportive of the idea that the good health and safety 
performance is an indicator of good management, and are generally 
interested  in  finding  out  more  about  health  and  safety’  (Claros 
Consulting, 2002: 15).  
 
There has been a related recognition that the CSR agenda can serve the function 
of increasing the amount and quality of information available to stakeholders 
(see  Dawkins  and  Lewis,  2003;  Roberts,  2003;  Lydenberg,  2005).    New 
corporate  codes  and  reports  and  forms  of  internal  reporting  can  address 
asymmetries of information and imbalances of knowledge that characterise the 
relationship  between  the  different  communities  of  interest.    The  European   11 
Commission’s  CSR  Green  Paper  devoted  much  of  its  attention  to  issues  of 
reporting and auditing of companies’ social performance and to the implications 
for  investment  practice.  It  suggested  that  ‘the  involvement  of  stakeholders, 
including trade unions and NGOs, could improve the quality of verification’ of 
company reporting on social and environmental issues (Commission, 2001: 19).  
 
In  the  UK,  several  recent  corporate  governance  initiatives  have  advanced  a 
similar agenda (for a review and comparison with the US situation, see Aguilera 
et al., 2006). As a consequence of the Turnbull report on internal audit and 
control (ICAEW, 1999) all listed companies in Britain were required to include 
in their annual reports a section on their approach to managing and exploiting 
risk.  In viewing internal audit as a means of managing corporate risks, Turnbull 
was acting on the premise that corporate compliance with a variety of external 
regulatory controls and liability regimes was essential to the maintenance of 
long-term  shareholder  value.    New  legislation  requiring  pension  funds  to 
disclose their voting policy and to state the extent to which social, ethical and 
environmental investment matters are taken into consideration, came into force 
in 2001.
4 According to the Association of British Insurers, this requirement has 
had a ‘significant and wide-ranging impact on the investment community…[and 
has] added significantly to the growing Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) 
movement’  (ABI,  2001:  13).    During  2001  the  Company  Law  Review,  an 
independent commission charged with reporting to government on reforms to 
corporate law, recommended a regime of enhanced disclosure by companies of 
information relating to issues of social and environmental responsibility. The 
rationale underpinning this ‘operating and financial review’ (OFR) was that it 
would  assist  shareholders  and  other  stakeholders  in  making  better  informed 
judgements on non-financial aspects of corporate performance (Company Law 
Review, 2001: 49-54).  Although legislation making the OFR mandatory for 
companies above a certain size was introduced, before it could be brought into 
force the government announced in December 2005 that it was withdrawing the 
measure, following lobbying from the CBI (among others), on the grounds that 
it was unnecessary ‘red tape’.
5  In February 2006 the government announced 
that it was reconsidering its position in the light of litigation initiated by the 
NGO, Friends of the Earth, on the grounds that there had been a legal failure to 
consult  relevant  parties  on  the  repeal  of  the  law.    In  May  2006  the  DTI 
announced  that  a  new  version  of  the  OFR  would  be  introduced  into  the 
Companies Bill 2006, but this version did not contain the same requirement for 
companies to carry out a forward-looking review as before, and possibilities for 
litigation against boards in the context of the OFR were to be strictly limited, 
potentially blunting its impact.   
   12 
Some potential limits to a voluntarist approach in the area of CSR are suggested 
by the experience of the Kingsmill review of pay and gender equity, which was 
initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2001 (Kingsmill, 2001).  
This review argued that there was no need for new legislation in the equal pay 
field, notwithstanding a poor record in the UK of closing the pay gap between 
women and men, on the grounds that more could be achieved by a programme 
of government encouragement for pay audits by large companies, which, it was 
hoped, would generate a learning process, leading to the dissemination of best 
practice.  The review set out a role for institutional investors in putting pressure 
on the managements of listed companies to improve their performance on the 
issues of pay equity and work-life balance, on the grounds that, in the absence 
of such an improvement, shareholders would have legitimate concerns to the 
effect  that  valuable  corporate  assets,  in  the  sense  of  human  resources,  were 
being wasted.  However, there is so far only limited evidence of either investor 
engagement or of corporate reporting on these issues.  A not atypical reaction to 
Kingsmill at the time of the review was that 
 
‘Investors  will  only  put  value  on  measures  of  employment  of 
women once they have data on which to work.  Companies should 




Although  some  SRI  investment  funds  have  since  encouraged  companies  to 
conduct employment and pay reviews in the light of the Kingsmill review (see 
Henderson  Global  Investors,  2002),  it  is  unclear  whether  this  form  of 
engagement is having an impact on employment practices at company level.  
The Women and Work Commission, which carried out an independent review 
of  equal  pay  legislation  for  government  in  2006,  made  no  mention  of 
shareholder engagement as a mechanism for encouraging change at workplace 
level,  but  did  note  that  ‘progress  on  equal  pay  reviews,  particularly  in  the 
private sector, has stalled’ (Women and Work Commission, 2006: 79).  
 
A number of potential problems with shareholder activism in general and with 
the universal owner hypothesis in particular have been noted in earlier studies: 
these include the high costs of direct engagement and the dangers that other 
shareholders will free ride on the efforts of activists (see Armour, Deakin and 
Konzelmann, 2003).  Institutional features of UK corporate governance are also 
relevant here.  British trade unions have not so far exercised the same degree of 
influence over investment decisions as some of their US counterparts, in part 
because they do not have the decisive voice on boards of pension fund trustees 
that labour interests have in certain cases in America.  Pensions legislation has 
only relatively recently mandated that employee representatives should make up   13 
half the membership of boards of trustees of defined benefit pension funds.  
There  is  also  some  legal  uncertainty  over  the  degree  to  which  social  and 
environmental  considerations  can  be  taken  into  account  by  trustees  when 
making decisions on investments, although opinion on this issue seems to be 
shifting in favour of allowing trustees greater discretion.  As most employer-
based pension schemes move from a defined-benefit structure to one based on 
defined  contributions,  with  an  increased  risk  of  losses  from  stock  market 
fluctuations falling on employees, it is possible that members will become more 
risk averse and it will be more difficult to make the case for SRI.  However, the 
move to defined contribution schemes also means that employers play less of a 
role in pension fund governance, so opening up a new opportunity for unions to 
use this forum to press for SRI.  Where unions have most clearly exercised their 
influence so far is in encouraging pension funds set up for their own employees 
and officers to take up an SRI-related agenda.  A number of unions have used 
this route to give SRI-based mandates to fund managers.  This is a relatively 
recent development and its impact on the companies in which these funds invest 
is not yet clear. 
 
In  addition  to  these  potential  legal  and  institutional  obstacles,  shareholder 
engagement  on  employment  issues  appears  to  be  affected  by  the  same 
conceptual division between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of CSR that we 
noted above in our organizational case studies.  Between 2002 and 2004, the 
consultancy  Impactt  carried  out  a  project  on  behalf  of  a  consortium  of 
purchasing  companies  and  investors,  aimed  at  addressing  the  problem  of 
excessive  overtime  working  in  Chinese  factories  which  formed  part  of  the 
purchasing  companies’  supply  chains.    The  objective  of  the  project  was  ‘to 
reduce  excessive  overtime  without  reducing  wages,  through  building  the 
factories’ own capacity to improve productivity, human resources management, 
and internal communication’; this was to be achieved by avoiding an over-rigid 
approach to compliance-based audits, with ‘a new approach, one which allows 
for gradual change over time [and] presents a clear business case to factory 
managers’  (Impactt,  2006:  4).    Among  the  outcomes  of  the  project  was  a 
recommendation to investors that ‘badly managed workplaces with substandard 
labour conditions are also inefficient, unproductive workplaces’, and that they 
could no longer rely on ‘a presumption… that low labour costs will inevitably 
offset low productivity’.  The project is a striking illustration of the use of CSR-
related mechanisms to initiate organizational change; but only in the context of 
an ‘external’ conception of CSR.  While it is clear that long-hours working, and 
its  negative  repercussions  for  worker  health  and  safety  and  productivity,  is 
problem of a different order of magnitude in China than in the UK, the basic 
issues are the same.  However, there is, to our knowledge, no equivalent to the 
Impactt project for long-hours working in the UK itself.   14 
Conclusions 
 
CSR is, without doubt, an area of potential importance for the re-embedding of 
the business enterprise in society.  From the managerial perspective, it can lead 
to  a  better  balancing  of  corporate  objectives  and  societal  risks;  from  the 
regulatory perspective, it offers the prospect of reflexive types of regulation, 
based on a learning process, which move away from the dichotomy between 
command-and-control and deregulation; and from the financial perspective it 
holds out the possibility of new types of deliberation, based around shareholder 
engagement  with  enterprises.    However,  the  case  studies  presented  above 
suggest that this model is far from being realized in practice, in the UK at least.  
From the managerial perspective, evidence that CSR is truly embedded in firms 
at the organizational level is rare.  A high level of engagement with CSR issues, 
if understood in terms of the anticipation of new risks and competitive shocks, 
requires an organisational commitment which most British businesses have yet 
to make.  From the regulatory perspective, there is doubt over the effectiveness 
of a strategy based on reflexive law, in the face of evidence that most firms are 
content with ‘basic compliance’ with standards, and that where a framework of 
hard  law  is  entirely  absent,  voluntary  responses  from  firms  may  not  be 
forthcoming.  Finally, from a financial perspective, research suggests that there 
are, at present, structural limitations on the capacity of shareholder engagement 
to reorientate corporate behaviour towards a CSR agenda.  The theme running 
through these conclusions is that the potential of CSR will be, very largely, 
unfulfilled, as long as prevailing conceptions of the enterprise and its role in 
society remain in place.   
   15 
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